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Financial deregulation and the role 
of statecraft: Lessons from Britain’s 
1971 Competition and Credit Control 
measures 
 
 
 
Within the financialisation literature, a number of approaches identify the coexistence of 
financial expansion and productive stagnation. Yet there is no consensus on which direction 
causality operates between these two phenomena. This impasse has been widened by the lack 
of attention paid to the role of statecraft strategies in mediating possible causal mechanisms. 
This article contributes to rectifying this shortcoming by focusing on the governance 
advantages granted to states through financial deregulation. By presenting archival evidence 
on Britain’s 1971 Competition and Credit Control deregulation, this article lends support to 
financialisation accounts that argue that weaknesses in the productive economy spurred 
financial expansion, yet it also indicates that the state’s desire for depoliticised forms of 
governance played a crucial role in mediating this relationship. This further suggests that IPE 
should focus on the strategic manner in which states relate to markets. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Panitch and Konings observed in 2009 that ‘[i]f a single root cause has predominated 
in explanations of the current global financial crisis, it is “deregulation”’ (67). Yet 
financial deregulation is often now taken as the point of departure, from which to 
explain the consequent changes in state/market dynamics; rather than close attention 
being paid to the perceived governing advantages that motivated deregulation in the 
first place. This latter puzzle is the key focus of this article, and is of great political 
significance. Hillary Clinton’s struggle in reconciling the paid speeches she gave to 
Wall Street with her candidacy in the 2016 Democratic primaries is a good example 
of how one explanation of financial deregulation – state capture by financial elites – 
has become a serious concern for the US electorate (NYT 2016). Indeed, diagnoses of 
the causes of financial deregulation have great bearing on the question of ‘what is to 
be done?’; that is, stronger state insulation from financial lobbying, closing the 
revolving door between the financial sector and government, or a more radical 
reimagining of social relations.  
   This article begins by arguing that within the financialisation literature there exists 
a strand that focuses on the relationship between real economy stagnation and 
financial expansion. There is no consensus on the direction of causality between 
these twin phenomena, with expropriation accounts arguing that the bloated financial 
sector has sapped resources from industry, while crisis resolution accounts insist 
weaknesses in the productive economy have necessitated financial expansion as a 
palliative. A major shortcoming in this literature is the lack of attention paid to state 
governance strategies, despite financial deregulation playing a central role in the 
narratives of both approaches. This mirrors a broader problem with how IPE - of both 
the dichotomous ‘states and markets’ and neo-Gramscian-inspired variants - has 
traditionally understood state/market relations. It will be argued that this 
financialisation debate would greatly benefit from an engagement with the literature 
on depoliticisation and crisis – a trail blazed by Krippner (2011). By taking statecraft 
seriously we can gain further insight into how states have used financial deregulation 
to insulate themselves from political criticism. This will shed light on the validity of 
the expropriation and crisis resolution explanations, as well as providing a clearer 
understanding of the strategic nature of state/market relations.  
   In order to examine the relationship between financial deregulation and statecraft, 
this article will analyse Britain’s 1971 Competition and Credit Control (CCC) 
measures. CCC revolutionised monetary policy by shifting emphasis away from 
quantitative restrictions on bank lending and towards interest rates. In the process, the 
government dismantled the majority of its direct controls on banks, leading CCC to 
be characterised as perhaps the first major financial deregulation of the postwar era 
(Buckle and Thompson 1992: 43). By all accounts, this was a disaster: bank lending 
to the private sector rose from £1.9 to £6.4 billion in a single year, an enormous 
property bubble emerged, and the Secondary Banking Crisis struck in 1973 (Wilson 
Committee 1980: 7). Yet rather than rehearse the story of CCC’s failure, this article 
will draw on evidence from the National Archives and the University of Warwick’s 
Modern Records Centre to analyse the reasoning behind the Treasury’s passing of 
this deregulation. It will be argued that it was the intensifying economic stagnation, 
expressed as a personal borrowing boom and a crisis of company liquidity, that 
demonstrated to the Treasury that the existing monetary controls were unsuited for 
maintaining a balance of payments surplus. The lending ceilings could neither 
effectively redistribute credit from individuals to companies nor hide the state’s hand 
in the process. The Bank of England’s (referred to here as the Bank) CCC proposal, 
by allocating credit according to ability to pay higher interest rates, promised to both 
channel financial resources away from consumers and towards exporting firms, and 
to mask the state’s role in the process. It was this combination of functional and 
depoliticising advantages that led the Treasury to accept CCC.  
   Two important conclusions for IPE can be drawn from this case. Firstly, the 
evidence presented here, while insufficient to dismiss the broader claims of the 
expropriation approach, does support the crisis resolution claims that deregulation 
was a response to the dwindling of postwar prosperity. However, secondly, the case 
of CCC demonstrates the importance of taking statecraft seriously as an explanatory 
factor. The state did not automatically deregulate finance at the first sign of crisis. 
Instead, deregulation resulted from the state’s search for a form of governance that 
could depoliticise the state’s role in managing crisis, by outsourcing the enforcement 
of financial discipline to the price mechanism. This suggests - in the same manner as 
Krippner (2007) - that IPE should focus on how states relate strategically to markets, 
rather than remaining preoccupied with the illusory notion of the state/market tug of 
war. 
 
 
 
Financialisation and the role of statecraft 
 
   Since the 1990s, the term financialisation has been used to describe a great variety 
of phenomena, as well as projected into the past to characterise older theories. The 
purpose here is not to provide a more or less comprehensive overview of this large 
body of literature, but instead to examine a specific strand of this literature that is 
concerned with the causal relationship between economic stagnation and financial 
profligacy. A number of approaches within the broad rubric of financialisation have 
recognised the coexistence of two important trends in advanced capitalist economies 
since the 1970s: the slowdown of growth in the real economy, evidenced by low rates 
of fixed capital investment and relatively weak GDP growth; and the expansion of 
the financial sector, reflected in the proliferation of financial instruments and the 
inflation and bursting of credit bubbles (van Treeck 2009). Yet there is a sharp 
disagreement on the direction of causality between these two phenomena. These 
approaches can roughly be grouped into two categories: expropriation, which claims 
that financial expansion has weakened the real economy; and crisis resolution, which 
proposes that the weaknesses in the real economy have provoked financial expansion. 
   Scholars advancing the expropriation thesis have tended to argue that a significant 
transformation in corporate strategy has taken place since the 1980s, away from long-
term fixed capital investments and towards short-term measures to keep stock prices 
rising. In pursuit of this objective, companies ploughed retained earnings back into 
their own stock and increased dividend payments to shareholders, draining the 
reserves available for future investment (Stockhammer 2004; Lazonick 2011). 
Furthermore, earnings that were reinvested became increasingly directed towards 
short-term financial assets, such as securitised debt. Income streams based on this 
interest-accruing activity began to outpace traditional returns from fixed investment 
(Orhangazi 2008). As Crotty (2003: 2) argues, the net result of these developments 
has been the restructuring of the non-financial corporation from ‘an integrated 
combination of illiquid real assets’ to a ‘“portfolio” of liquid subunits that … 
management must continually restructure to maximise the stock price’. 
Financialisation, as such, constitutes the ‘parasitic’ transfer of rents from productive 
to financial capital (Duménil & Lévy 2002: 62).  
   Crisis resolution approaches posit causality in the opposite direction. There are two 
different chains of causation proposed in this literature: one in which finance props 
up effective demand, and the other in which finance supports stagnating production. 
The first explanation relies on the existence of a contradiction within capitalist 
society between economic uncertainty/instability and the need for ‘confident mass 
consumers’ (Crouch 2009: 320). Following the inflationary crisis of the 1970s, a new 
strategy to alleviate this contradiction emerged, namely ‘privatised Keynesianism’ 
(Crouch 2009) or what Hay et al. (2008) termed ‘house price Keynesianism’. This 
consisted chiefly of the extension of private credit instruments to working people, 
especially cheap mortgages, in order to stimulate consumption and assuage the social 
conflict arising from the wage repression of the neoliberal era (Crouch 2009; Watson 
2010; Streeck 2011).  
   The second type of crisis resolution explanation focuses on the weaknesses of 
productive capital. For Arrighi (2010), this is a historically recurrent phenomenon 
that characterises the moment in which hegemonic capitalist economies reach the end 
of their lifecycle. The Marxian-Kaleckian school claims that, during the era of 
‘monopoly capitalism’, massive barriers to market entry cause stagnation in fixed 
investment, and surpluses are instead channeled into financial assets (Bellamy Foster 
2007). Alternatively, other Marxist scholars argue that the falling rate of profit on 
productive investments1 has triggered an expansion of credit as a palliative measure, 
as well as the shifting of corporate investment funds from fixed capital to more 
profitable financial assets (Brenner 2006; Kliman 2012). Common to these diverse 
approaches is the notion that the frenzied expansion of finance has served as a 
‘temporal fix’ to the underlying crisis in capitalist production, by postponing the 
crisis into the future (Harvey 2006).  
   The greatest shortcoming of the expropriation and crisis resolution approaches is 
their treatment of the state. The problem is not that the state is absent and needs to be 
‘brought back in’ (Evans et al. 1985; Helleiner 1995). State action, via financial 
deregulation, is a crucial mechanism through which causality operates in both 
accounts. Rather, the problem is that the state is simply understood as a conduit for 
economic forces and elite interests, instead of an important strategic actor in its own 
right. More specifically, insufficient attention is paid to ‘statecraft’ - the governance 
strategies through which states seek to achieve their policy objectives without 
sacrificing their legitimacy (Bulpitt 1986: 21). Bulpitt’s statecraft thesis focuses on 
the ‘Court’ – defined as the Prime Minister and their friends and advisors (Buller 
1999: 694). The Court, Bulpitt argued, strategises so as to achieve a degree of 
‘governing competence’ over economic activity while also securing their (re)election 
(Bulpitt 1986: 22). Despite the fact that Bulpitt focused on political leaders, the 
concept of statecraft has consequently been used to analyse the strategic machinations 
of less senior politicians and even unelected officials operating within the Treasury 
and Bank (Rogers 2009; Burnham 2011). Yet central to all statecraft analyses – and 
conspicuously missing from the financialisation literature’s treatment of the state – is 
a focus on state actors’ attempts to strategically reconcile two objectives: legitimacy 
and governability. 
   From an expropriation perspective, Stockhammer (2004; 2016) argues that 
financial deregulation was part of a wider political project that favoured profit-hungry 
shareholders over prestige-oriented corporate managers. In accordance with this, 
Crotty (2009: 564) insists, ‘radical deregulation [was] pushed by financial institutions 
and justified by efficient financial market theory’. Duménil & Lévy (2004: 69) go as 
far as to characterise the 1979 Volcker shock as a ‘coup’ by financial elites. However, 
these bold claims of state capture are presented with little historical evidence. Davis 
and Walsh (2016: 14) attempt to fill this gap by drawing on interview and archival 
material to propose that the British state’s pro-finance stance constituted a ‘slow, 
staged coup’ against domestic industry. This arose because Thatcherite ideologues 
with previous City careers began to colonise the Treasury, which in turn gained 
greater power over the Department of Trade and Industry. This echoes Baker (1999: 
84-6), who emphasises that the British state’s deregulatory agenda is best explained 
by reference to the ‘reconfiguration of the social basis of the state’, whereby groups 
such as the CBI were ‘increasingly excluded from policy discussions’ at the expense 
of City institutions. Financial deregulation, then, is usually explained by 
expropriation accounts as resulting from the growing power of financial actors to 
influence policy.  
   Crisis resolution approaches, on the other hand, explain the government’s 
motivation in promoting finance as arising from two sources. Firstly, leading 
capitalist states reacted quite automatically to the crises of industrial stagnation and 
global hegemony by freeing up excess funds through credit market deregulation 
(Brenner 2002: 40-42; Arrighi 2010: 326). Secondly, by ‘pulling forward future 
resources into [the] present’, financial deregulation constituted a ‘strategy of social-
conflict management’, whereby various sectors of society could be appeased with lax 
credit rules (Streeck 2011: 12-17). While this moves beyond the expropriation view 
of the state as a reflection of factional struggles, the state is still conceived as a 
primarily reactive entity. States are understood to face external imperatives from 
markets, to which they must react accordingly; such that there is little consideration 
of how changing statecraft strategies blur the line between political and marketised 
governance. Krippner (2011), with her focus on the US authorities’ experimentation 
with financial deregulation as a way to insulate policy-making from scrutiny, is the 
only exception to this trend.  
   This inattention to statecraft reflects a more general shortcoming with how certain 
influential IPE approaches have theorised state/market relations. Despite the radical 
orientation of the authors, many crisis resolution approaches, with their emphasis on 
the external market imperatives faced by states, reproduce a politics/economy 
dichotomy similar to that found in the more mainstream IPE works of Gilpin (1987) 
and Strange (1997). States and markets are demarcated as relatively self-enclosed 
entities which represent opposed modes of social organisation. States may yield 
control of certain spheres under pressure from market imperatives, or they may seize 
control of previously privatised spheres, but as Clift (2014: 32) writes, in both 
scenarios one ‘predominates at the other’s expense’. For example, while Strange 
(1994: 213) admits that the US’ drive to deregulate financial markets arose from a 
strategic desire to shore up US structural power, the result was an unambiguous, 
‘self-inflicted’ loss of power to markets - an own goal of sorts. The delegation of 
authority to market forces is not itself analysed as a possible goal of state strategy.  
   On the other hand, expropriation accounts of state capture by economic elites echo 
the claims of neo-Gramscian scholars. Alongside Strange’s writings, this approach is 
amongst the most important strands of critical IPE (Cohen 2007). Scholars in this 
tradition attempt to transcend state/market dualism by noting their mutual 
constitution, yet in the process they effectively reduce the state to an expression of 
the fractional struggles within the capitalist class (Van der Pijl 1989; Burnham 1991). 
State/market antagonisms are understood as tensions between local and transnational 
fractions of capital, such that Strange’s theory of power being transferred from states 
to markets is replaced by the notion of a redistribution of power between different 
capitals. The state’s importance as a strategic actor is therefore diminished. Even 
Underhill’s sophisticated conceptualisation of states and markets as different aspects 
of the same ‘integrated ensemble of governance’ tends to fall back on this pluralist 
state theory, in which social actors compete for the role of state puppeteer (2000: 
807).  
   The problem with both of these lines of argument, as they exist in financialisation 
debates and IPE discussions of state/market relations, is that they take the state 
seriously only insofar as it is a vessel buffeted by market forces or colonised by 
economic interests. The task of studying statecraft itself is thus rendered non-
essential. 
 
 
Depoliticised statecraft 
 
   This impasse can be overcome by focusing on how financialisation has been 
mediated by the statecraft of depoliticisation. This idea has recently gained traction 
amongst IPE scholars. Lagna (2016) examines how the Italian state has used 
derivatives to extend its control over the economy through a financialised, and thus 
seemingly non-political, avenue. Similarly, Major (2012: 537) argues that 
governments have attempted to mask their responsibility for economic management 
through the ‘movement of regulatory activities into technocratic, insular institutions’. 
Yet neither work references the extensive literature on depoliticisation, of which 
there is arguably already a ‘second wave’ (Hay 2014).  
   Depoliticisation is a concept that has been operationalised to explain a host of 
different phenomena across a variety of social science disciplines. However, common 
to all is a focus on the process of removing the ‘politics’ from a specific sphere of 
social life. Wood and Flinders (2014) provide a useful summary of the varying 
interpretations, which they categorise into three broad groups: governmental, societal 
and discursive. This article, which focuses on the depoliticisation strategies 
consciously employed by state actors, will draw on literature that generally falls into 
the first category (governmental). As a statecraft strategy, depoliticisation refers to a 
form of governance in which state actors seek to reconcile legitimacy and 
governability objectives by seemingly emptying economic policy of its political 
content, so that it appears to be a purely technical affair. Bulpitt (1986: 28-32) writes 
that the discipline of governance requires state authorities to gain a certain autonomy 
from the pressures of various sections of society by seeking to establish ‘automatic 
rules or pilots’ that allow for the ‘euthanasia of politics’. The goal of depoliticisation 
is to place ‘at one remove the political character of decision-making’ so as to allow 
the state to achieve its policy goals in a more insulated and effective manner 
(Burnham 2001: 128). When this strategy is successful, the authorities can hope to 
attain credibility in the eyes of global financial markets, reduce the burden of policy-
making through delegation, and avoid blame for policy failures (Flinders and Buller 
2006: 296).  
   Depoliticisation is particularly useful for explaining statecraft in the context of 
economic crisis (Donmez 2014). Kettell (2008: 631) points out that governments of 
democratic capitalist polities must reproduce the conditions for profitable capital 
accumulation, while displaying ‘at least a semblant of a connection to the views and 
wishes of the electorate’. This is referred to by Watson (2009) and Rogers (2013) as 
the contradiction between ‘accumulation’ and ‘legitimation’. When capital 
accumulation falters, as in the ‘generalized austerity characteristic of the neoliberal 
era’, this dilemma is intensified - the state must both manage a lackluster economy 
and avoid blame for this poor performance in the eyes of the electorate (Krippner 
2007: 479). As Rogers (2009) explains, this contradiction encourages the state to 
depoliticise economic management, and thus achieve adequate political cover to 
discipline labour and boost the competitiveness of the national economy on the global 
stage. If post-crisis economic restructuring, with its attendant pains, appears to be the 
result of discretionary policy decisions, then the governing administration can expect 
to pay at the polls or even provoke a more serious crisis of state legitimacy. 
Depoliticisation, then, can be seen as vital governing strategy in times of crisis.  
   The literature on depoliticisation provides IPE with a powerful analytical tool for 
understanding statecraft in the context of financialisation. Krippner (2011) seized on 
this observation in a groundbreaking work, arguing that what some commentators 
have understood as the ‘retreat of the state’ through financial deregulation and 
monetary policy independence is better understood as a strategic move towards a 
regime of depoliticised governance. In the same vein, Burnham (2011) analysed 
Britain’s adoption of a partly-marketised interest rate in 1972. He concluded that 
rather than ceding power to markets, this decision constituted a deliberate strategy to 
exercise state power through depoliticised channels. This focus on statecraft aids in 
adjudicating between the competing claims of expropriation and crisis resolution 
interpretations of financialisation, insofar as they relate to the state, by overcoming 
the neo-Gramscian state capture thesis implicit in the former and the automaticity and 
politics/economy dualism that characterises the state’s reaction to crisis in the latter.  
   In addition, this approach eschews the unitary vision of the state that is 
characteristic of the aforementioned approaches. As Mitchell (1991: 78, 86) correctly 
notes, one should not overstate the ‘coherence, unity and absolute autonomy’ of the 
state as a ‘self-willed entity’. While the notion of ‘state’ is obviously central to 
conceptions of statecraft, the analysis itself necessitates moving beyond this degree 
of abstraction to a more concrete focus on the (often conflicting) political strategies 
employed by actors in different branches of the government. The state is thus not 
accepted as a static, unchanging whole. Rather, the study of depoliticisation tracks 
how the contradictions of governance lead political elites to redraw the boundaries of 
state authority. As such, the concept of depoliticisation refers to the process of state 
(re)making itself. This in turn creates space for a distinctly strategic understanding of 
state/market relations within IPE. The intentional blurring of the lines between 
political and market authority implied by financial deregulation serves to give 
political actors cover in times of recession. The marketisation of spheres that were 
formally subject to overt state control represents the strategic outsourcing of 
discipline from elected representatives and civil servants to abstract notions of 
‘global economy’ or ‘world market’.   
   The remainder of this article will examine the utility of this approach by focusing 
on the governance dilemmas and perceived resolutions that motivated the state’s 
adoption of the 1971 CCC deregulation.   
 
 
 
 
Historical background: From devaluation to 
CCC 
 
   The CCC deregulation was introduced in autumn 1971, yet this radical shift in 
financial governance had its roots in the 1967 sterling devaluation. In November 
1967, Harold Wilson’s Labour government devalued sterling from $2.80 to $2.40, 
following the escalating costs of imperial military expenditure, excessive private 
investment abroad, and a worsening trade performance expressed in a balance of 
payments crisis (Clarke and Pulay 2012: 53). In aid of devaluation,2 Labour also 
introduced a package of austerity measures, which included tax increases, public 
expenditure cuts, and a tightening of monetary policy. This last policy became the 
centrepiece of the government’s attempt to restructure Britain’s increasingly stagnant 
economy. The authorities had six monetary tools to achieve this: liquidity controls; 
hire-purchase controls; open market operations; Bank Rate; special deposits; and 
lending ceilings (see Needham 2014: 14-18). It was the lending ceilings - a 
combination of formal and informal requests for banks to keep their total lending 
below a certain level - that acted as the front line of this complicated system.  
   Yet less than four years later, during the rule of Edward Heath’s Conservative 
government, and with monetary tightening still imperative, the authorities 
revolutionised this regime with the introduction of CCC. In contrast to the complex 
array of government-operated controls, CCC represented a stripped-down system that 
functioned largely through market mechanisms. Lending ceilings, hire-purchase 
controls, and the clearing bank cartel were abolished. Banks’ interest rates were no 
longer directly linked to Bank Rate, but were instead allowed to move as banks 
wished, although broadly in line with Bank Rate. Bank Rate itself was soon replaced 
by the Minimum Lending Rate (MLR), a partly-marketised mechanism (Moran 1984). 
In short, the state ceased to impose a preferential system of credit distribution upon 
the banking sector, instead allowing the market to allocate credit to whoever could 
pay the highest interest rate.  
   In explaining this policy transformation, the existing literature focuses on the Bank, 
which played the predominant role in formulating CCC. It is possible to discern three 
key factors behind the Bank’s decision in the existing literature. Firstly, British 
policy-makers became increasingly open to monetary targeting following a £1.4 
billion IMF loan in 1967 and its attendant conditionalities. This began with a 1968 
IMF seminar in London on the centrality of monetary targets and led to the formation 
of the Money Supply Group and the Monetary Policy Group within the Bank (Clift 
and Tomlinson 2012; Needham 2014). Secondly, as the money supply increased 
rapidly, clearing banks began to lose market share to institutions offering higher 
interest rates (Gowland 1978: 84). This threatened the Bank’s monetary governance, 
because they used the clearing banks as an intermediary through which to transmit 
monetary policy to the entire banking system (Needham 2014: 30-1). By abolishing 
the cartel, the clearing banks would be forced to increase their competitivity and thus 
reassert their dominance, safeguarding the Bank’s mechanism of monetary control. 
Thirdly, the Bank was frustrated with political roadblocks. The Bank’s innovative 
strategies for monetary control largely fell on deaf ears regarding both the Wilson 
and Heath administrations. In particular, Conservative Chancellor Anthony Barber’s 
refusal to increase interest rates in 1970 spurred the Bank’s desperation to circumvent 
the traditional avenues of monetary policy, resulting in the outline of CCC (Needham 
2014: 37-9). 
   The aforementioned factors explain the Bank’s desire to institute a more laissez-
faire system, but the reasons for the Treasury’s acceptance of CCC are less clear. 
While CCC was implemented in October 1971, the Bank had informed the Treasury 
of its progress in January and sent earlier drafts to them in February - rather late in 
the day, but still enough time for the Treasury to make its influence felt. The 
Treasury’s collective thought process during this period has been explained in a 
number of ways. Many authors have ignored the Treasury’s role or have treated this 
issue as a black box (Gowland 1978; Capie 2010; Reid 1982). Needham (2014), on 
the other hand, probes deeper, arguing that the Treasury had already developed an 
affinity with the Bank’s approach to credit control, following the IMF’s intervention 
in the late 1960s. He further argues that the Treasury was misled, along with 
Ministers, into thinking that CCC was about something that it was not, namely 
genuine competition. Burnham (2007: 413) also considers CCC a case of the 
Treasury being outmaneuvered by the Bank, as the latter succeeded for a time in 
reasserting ‘its traditional role in the face of perceived Treasury interference’. For 
Moran (1984) the Treasury’s assent was gained by a combination of the Bank 
winning the intellectual argument and exploiting the new Chancellor’s naivety. Even 
more importantly, the ‘introduction of CCC was a sign that the cheap credit lobby 
[industry] in Whitehall had been eclipsed’, as City interests had momentarily gained 
pride of place in the Treasury (Moran 1984: 52).  
   This article will contribute to overcoming the lack of clarity on the Treasury’s 
motivations for approving of CCC, through a close archival analysis. This focus on 
the Treasury derives from the fact that its role in passing CCC has faced limited 
academic scrutiny, unlike the role of the Bank. In addition, this analysis will follow 
recent contributions (Rogers 2009; Burnham 2011) in extending Bulpitt’s statecraft 
thesis to important officials and advisors within the Treasury – who, it will be 
demonstrated, also faced pressures to reconcile legitimacy and governability. When 
dealing with the ‘esoteric politics’ of pre-Thatcherite monetary policy, Moran (1984: 
27) is right to argue that much of the focus must necessarily be on the relatively small 
cabal of civil servants that operated monetary levers. Elected ministers, while 
important to the analysis, played a more broadly guiding role.  
   The evidence presented in this article will show that the Treasury was neither duped 
by the Bank nor was industry simply out-lobbied by the City. Instead, the stagnation 
crisis, expressed as a boom in personal and corporate borrowing, politicised the 
existing monetary controls and pushed the Treasury to accept CCC as way to 
redistribute credit from labour to capital in a depoliticised fashion. 
 
 
 
The Treasury’s dilemma 
    
   The crisis that was gathering momentum by the end of the 1960s appeared to the 
Treasury in the form of two intractable obstacles to smooth economic governance: a 
stubborn growth in personal borrowing in the face of real wage stagnation; and a 
corporate liquidity crisis resulting from a secular fall in profitability. More 
specifically, these two phenomena wrought havoc with the authorities’ chief policy 
aim, post-devaluation, namely to mount a sustained recovery in the balance of 
payments. This governing failure in turn brought scrutiny upon the Treasury, such 
that their attempted regressive redistribution of credit from persons to companies 
became blatantly politicised, endangering the insular nature of British statecraft. 
 
 
Personal borrowing 
 
   A key monetary policy goal, following devaluation, was to reduce lending for 
personal consumption as a way to reduce imports. The austerity that accompanied 
devaluation in 1967 hit workers hard, as the wage share of GDP had peaked in the 
early 1960s and had since begun to decline (Murphy 2011). In response, many people 
extended their borrowing as a way to bolster their incomes. Lending to persons 
continued to increase for nine months after the monetary tightening that accompanied 
devaluation.3 Consequently, total consumer spending was running higher in the 
second of half of 1968 than 1967, despite the Budget’s aim to reduce it by two per 
cent. This came as a surprise to Labour Chancellor Roy Jenkins:  
                   
It could not be argued that the Budget had been insufficiently harsh in respect of 
personal consumption, yet it was clear that people were very resistant to lowering 
their standard of living. There was little reason to believe that they would not take 
countervailing action to maintain their standard of living … 4 
 
Thus, in November 1968 the credit ceiling was further reduced to 98 per cent of its 
1967 level, with credit for exports and shipbuilding excluded. The intention to 
redistribute credit away from personal consumption and towards capital was explicit. 
As Treasury economist Arnold Lovell told Treasury official Robert Armstrong later 
that year: ‘We do not want to inhibit industrial expansion or activity … we do want to 
curb the growth in consumer demand, in the hope that this will encourage the shift of 
resources into exports’.5  
   Yet banks quickly developed ways to evade the authorities’ controls, as they began 
to lose customers to new secondary banks. The main finance houses started to ignore 
the government’s requests to provide personal loans with terms at least as strict as the 
hire purchase rules. By April 1971 Barclays had announced the launch of a new 
personal loans scheme, which would extend credit ‘from £100 to £1,000, to anyone 
over 18, whether a customer of Barclays or not, who is credit-worthy and in regular 
employment’.6 This represented an ‘embarrassing’ circumvention of government 
policy.7  
   In addition to wielding monetary policy to directly reduce consumption, the 
Treasury also did so indirectly, by using credit control as an industrial relations 
strategy. Industrial conflict intensified from the mid-1960s, with the number of days 
lost to strikes rising from 2.8 million in 1967 to 10.9 million in 1970 when the 
Conservatives arrived in power (Whittingham and Towers 1977: 77). This conflict 
meant that any perceived monetary relaxation could be interpreted by the unions as 
the beginning of another boom period, fuelling bolder pay demands.8 If monetary 
relaxation boosted demand when industrial output was crippled by strikes, the effect 
on the balance of payments would be negative: ‘There was a distinct chance of 
industrial unrest and if this transpired it would be dangerous to stimulate demand for 
cars since the effect would be to increase imports’.9  
   This goal - to starve the flames of industrial conflict by tightening credit - came into 
direct conflict with the need to relieve industry’s financial difficulties. Treasury 
official Douglas Wass wrote in June 1971 that credit relaxation would ‘enable the 
[car] industry to sustain their medium term investment plans, and so establish their 
competitive position vis-a-vis the Common Market producers’.10 Yet this would send 
the wrong message to car firms with regards to pay settlements: ‘The industry has 
undoubtedly been the maverick of employers in the private sector so far as incomes 
restraint is concerned. It has totally disregarded the Government’s exhortations to 
exercise moderation’.11 As such, if any monetary relaxation took place ‘the industry 
will I am sure feel that it has nothing to fear from the Government and that much of 
the talk about punishment for those who transgress in the field of pay negotiations is 
without substance’.12  
   This highlights the inability of existing monetary controls to achieve the 
government’s stated policy goals. The same action necessary to discourage 
inflationary pay claims would simultaneously threaten the liquidity and export 
capacity of British capital – a problem that will become more clear in the following 
section.  
 
 
Corporate liquidity 
 
   The crisis in corporate liquidity was recognised by the Treasury later than the 
personal borrowing boom, yet when it was acknowledged it was regarded as a 
fundamental challenge to their governing objectives. British industrial and 
commercial companies’ rate of profit fell from 14.2 per cent in 1960 to 8.7 per cent in 
1970.13 As a result, their net liquidity tumbled from the early 1960s, hovering around 
zero from 1965-68, before plummeting to a deficit of more than £1,000 million by 
1970 (CBI 1977: 15-17). In response, companies extended their bank overdrafts. 
From 1956-60, 90 per cent of industrial and commercial companies’ funds came from 
internal sources (chiefly retained profits) and just 10 per cent came from external 
sources (bank borrowing, government grants etc.). Yet by 1966-70, the ratio had 
changed to 80 per cent and 20 per cent (Thomas 1978: 310). 
   Throughout 1969 evidence mounted that suggested the company liquidity shortage 
was beginning to jeopardise the balance of payments recovery.14 Statistics showed 
that between November 1967 and mid-September 1969, London clearing bank 
lending rose by £563 million - £537 million of which was to manufacturing 
industry.15 In a meeting on 18 December, Bank Governor Leslie O’Brien, Treasury 
advisor Michael Posner, and Treasury Chief Economic Advisor Donald MacDougall 
agreed that some monetary easing was now appropriate, although only ‘without 
giving the impression of any general relaxation’.16 These pressures intensified in 
1970. In January the Bank Governor informed Chancellor Jenkins of an ‘extremely 
tight’ liquidity shortage: 
 
So far it appears that companies have coped with the squeeze on them by running 
down their liquid resources, taking trade credit wherever possible, repatriating funds 
from abroad and economising on stocks … The question is whether, nevertheless, 
companies will be forced by the financial stringency to prune their investment plans 
unless steps are taken to enable them to acquire extra finance from the banks, from the 
capital market or from the Government.17 
 
   A contradiction began to emerge in the Treasury’s handling of monetary policy. On 
the one hand, the expansion of the money supply, which had gained new importance 
since the IMF’s latest intervention, suggested that significant tightening was 
necessary. By reducing personal loans and deterring inflationary pay settlements, this 
would dampen the demand for imports. On the other hand, the performance of the 
company sector pointed in the opposite direction. If falling profitability was 
undermining companies’ investment plans, then Britain could not export its way out 
of its balance of payments problems unless companies could secure adequate credit. 
As Treasury official R J Painter explained to Second Permanent Secretary Frank 
Figgures in August 1970  
 
the forecast financial position of companies still looked very tight, and this… throws 
up the question whether continuation of present policies would cause companies to 
cut back their investment plans. At the same time we have to recognise that action of 
any kind which facilitated a larger increase in the money supply could tend to affect 
the reserves adversely.18 
 
   By November 1970 - two months before the Treasury first saw the Bank’s CCC 
proposals – this ‘dilemma’ had prompted the Treasury to realise that ‘policy on bank 
lending will have to be redefined’.19 It was not possible to pursue a reduction in ‘bad’ 
personal borrowing and ensure an expansion of ‘good’ corporate borrowing with the 
blunt monetary instruments at their disposal. As the Prime Minister’s Principal 
Private Secretary R T Armstrong explained, ‘there is no future in retaining the ceiling 
but exempting “credit for investment” from it. This is simply unworkable: the banks 
cannot identify credit to particular firms by purpose to the extent that this would 
indicate’.20 Furthermore, even if the credit ceilings could discriminate in this way, the 
Treasury’s Permanent Secretary Douglas Allen argued ‘it could not be altered 
frequently, and it was difficult to enforce effectively’.21 
   The post-devaluation system of monetary controls was not designed for this 
stagnant economic epoch. The contradictory need to both combat personal borrowing 
and alleviate industry’s liquidity drought pulled the controls in opposing directions. 
The Treasury’s key governing goal – to achieve a sustainable balance of payments 
surplus – was therefore jeopardised. Yet in addition to these functional shortcomings, 
the system of lending ceilings also challenged the government’s preference for 
depoliticised forms of statecraft. This will be examined next.  
 
 
The politicisation of monetary control 
 
   Lending ceilings, which had also been used in 1957-58 and 1961-2, were initially 
considered a depoliticised avenue through which to conduct monetary policy. There 
were two institutional layers separating the government from direct borrowers, 
namely the Bank of England and the clearing banks. This allowed the government to 
mask its influence on the money supply. As Painter commented  
 
The whole apparatus of “control” is a voluntary arrangement, operated as the City 
seem to prefer through the Bank of England in the driving seat. As long as the 
business carries on without too much controversy, there are advantages to 
Westminster and Whitehall in it being conducted at this remove.22  
    
Yet by the end of the 1960s the intensification of economic stagnation meant that 
controversy came frequently and in large doses, undermining the Treasury’s arms-
length statecraft.  
   As the government’s deflationary measures met growing resistance in the form of 
personal borrowing, the regressive nature of monetary policy became increasingly 
difficult to disguise. At the House of Commons in May 1968, Chancellor Jenkins was 
repeatedly questioned by Conservative MPs about the relationship between the 
monetary tightening and ‘the worst consecutive period of heavy unemployment 
which we have known since the 1930s’.23 Furthermore, even the monetary relaxation 
in July 1971 was seized upon for its pro-business bias, which the Daily Express 
reported with the subheading: ‘Not you! … [M]an-in-the-street borrowers can’t 
expect to get anything extra from the new deal’ (McKelvie 1971). 
   Despite monetary policy acting in industry’s favour, the Treasury came under 
sustained pressure from the CBI to go further. In 1969 the CBI stated that ‘a 
relaxation of the pressure on company liquidity is now called for’, which should be 
achieved by shifting emphasis away from tax manipulation towards monetary 
policy.24 In preparation for a CBI-Treasury meeting in January 1970, a brief was 
circulated which stated that the ‘suggestions that we have put forward [to the 
Treasury] over the last few months for easing the pressure of company liquidity’ 
include ‘[r]elaxation of the restrictions on bank lending’.25 The reason the CBI felt 
the need to ‘repeat our arguments’ to the Treasury regarding credit deregulation was 
that a full ten per cent of manufacturing firms were expected to restrict output 
because of ‘shortage of credit or finance’.26 These objections to government policy 
were made through official channels and during what Allen called the ‘regular 
CBI/Treasury Tea Parties’.27 
   In addition to facing flak from individual and industrial borrowers, the Treasury’s 
relationships with the clearing banks also began to fray. At a meeting between Bank 
officials and clearing bank representatives in early 1969, the clearing banks argued 
that, with deteriorating economic conditions, their customers were growing 
increasingly desperate for credit:  
 
Managers were tending to lose heart and the public image of the banks was getting 
worse and worse… The banks wondered whether H.M.Goverment [sic] fully 
understood their difficulties. They (the banks) feared that they would have to take the 
blame for the consequences of credit restriction.28 
 
Furthermore, it was not entirely clear whether the government even had the power to 
enforce their own directives. A Bank solicitor informed Lovell in 1969 that banks’ 
overdraft facilities could not be limited, and furthermore, attempts to punish the 
banks by lowering the interest rates on special deposits may not be legally 
enforceable.29 As such, in pursuing balance of payment objectives through the 
enforcement of lending ceilings, the authorities risked sparking a very public conflict 
with the City, which they could not be sure they would win.  
   Another source of scrutiny faced by the authorities was from the global investing 
community. As the credibility of the Treasury’s monetary strategy was called into 
question by their inability to meet money supply targets, they risked damaging the 
position of sterling. Regarding Domestic Credit Expansion targets (a metric 
advocated by the IMF (Clift and Tomlinson, 2012)), Painter explained to Treasury 
Deputy Secretary Alan Neale in April 1970 that ‘[w]e are of course in a dilemma. We 
have to give a figure of some sort, and yet we all know what a hostage to fortune it 
may be’.30 This concern continued after the Conservative’s electoral victory. 
Chancellor Barber’s Principal Private Secretary William Ryrie explained in July 1970 
that if the authorities were not seen to respond to ballooning bank loans ‘the 
Government’s monetary policy and policies for management of the economy 
generally would lose credibility’.31 The inadequacy of existing controls meant that 
any stated monetary target could quickly come back to haunt the authorities. With 
bank lending well above the five to seven per cent target in July and August 1970, the 
authorities had to respond in order to demonstrate that they had not lost control, 
without making unachievable commitments: ‘The essential task for us is to devise 
some weasely words which justify whatever signal we give to the clearing banks 
without pinning ourselves on the 5%/7% hook’.32 
   Before the Bank’s CCC proposal arrived on their desks, the Treasury was searching 
for a statecraft strategy that could shield them from scrutiny for their role in the 
mismanagement of monetary policy. The system of direct controls was seized upon 
for its unfairness from the perspective of the ‘man on the street’, it was heavily 
lobbied against by industry for its insufficiency in freeing up adequate credit for 
struggling businesses, and it brought the government’s economic credibility into 
question when monetary targets were missed. It is in this context – the failure of one 
form of depoliticised statecraft in the face of crisis – that we can understand the 
Treasury’s acceptance of CCC.  
 
 
 
Depoliticisation in place of solution  
 
   A new policy approach, CCC, landed in the Treasury’s lap in January 1971. Yet it 
did not initially appear to resolve the policy dilemmas that they faced. Andrew 
Britton, Senior Economic Advisor, succinctly captured this problem on 5 March:  
 
The present forecasts show a company sector financial position which is quite 
possibly critical in the short run and which is certainly not sustainable in the medium 
term. The policy problem is to help companies without an excessive growth of money 
supply.33 
 
CCC, it seemed, was too simplistic an instrument to effect this kind of regressive 
redistribution.34 Home Finance Advisor Frank Cassell was tasked with finding a 
compromise between the new approach and the existing export credit scheme in June, 
but was forced to conclude that the ‘blunt fact is we think they do not tie in together 
at all well’.35 These kinds of directional controls on lending clashed with CCC’s 
philosophy of allowing banks to arrange their portfolios however they pleased. 
Furthermore, as Figgures observed, CCC’s emphasis on increases in Bank Rate 
would be difficult to implement when ‘the cost of borrowing money was already 
close to the return on investment’.36 
   Nevertheless, the chief inadequacy of existing credit controls was judged to be the 
lending ceilings, not the price of credit. Indeed, domestic industry had become 
increasingly vocal in arguing this point. As early as 1969, the CBI had urged that 
‘more reliance should be placed on interest rates than restricting the availability of 
credit’.37 In 1970 the CBI President advised that, with regards to lobbying strategy  
 
the availability of finance was a more serious problem than its cost. These 
considerations suggest to me than an attack on the credit ceiling, in which we were 
associated with the Clearing Banks, would be preferable to a request to them to revert 
to their earlier interest rate structure.38 
 
This reasoning from industry was reinforced by the Bank. In response to concerns 
about higher interest rates hurting industrial investment, Bank Executive Director 
John Fforde reminded Figgures in March 1971 that ‘under the present arrangement 
some companies were denied credit at any price. The proposed scheme would help 
the financial position of these businesses’.39 In July the CBI reaffirmed their approval 
of the Bank’s plans in an Economic Committee Meeting:  
 
In general, the analysis and proposals set out in “Competition and Credit Control” are 
in line with the views of the Committee formulated in 1969, notably the intended 
change in emphasis from quantitative limits to interest rate policy.40  
 
This runs entirely counter to Moran’s claim that the ‘introduction of CCC was a sign 
that the cheap credit lobby [industry] in Whitehall had been eclipsed’ (1984: 51-52).41 
More broadly, it also contradicts the expropriation thesis that financial deregulation 
resulted from the power of financial elites to impose their agenda at industry’s 
expense. 
   In addition, CCC offered a way to rediscover a depoliticised monetary policy 
toolkit. After reading the proposals, Posner commented in February 1971 that 
‘several of us were attracted by the notion that we could escape from ceilings and run 
an ‘arms-length’ control of the banking system’.42 With lending ceilings abandoned, 
much of the tensions with the clearing banks would be alleviated, and the authorities 
could not be viewed by the public as directly restricting borrowing. Instead, it would 
be individuals’ own financial shortcomings that stopped them from accessing credit 
at high interest rates, veiling the transfer of credit resources from persons to 
companies. As Figgures explained in March, CCC ‘could be a means of very strict 
control, but by different methods which could bear more hardly on some than the 
present system’.43 This method of policy implementation would, as Barber assured 
Heath in May, ‘allow us to achieve the object of greater flexibility with a fully 
adequate control over monetary conditions’.44 There remained some concern that the 
‘new approach’ would not in fact depoliticise monetary policy enough, due to the 
greater role that special deposits would play. Allen argued that special deposits ‘had 
sometimes been turned down on political grounds - an unwillingness to advertise that 
monetary policy was being tightened’.45 Yet the Bank insisted that interest rates 
would be the key tool of monetary policy under the new scheme. To this end, the 
politically sensitive nature of Bank Rate movements would be ‘diffused’ by the 
creation of MLR - a new marketised system for setting interest rates.46 It was 
acknowledged by Fforde in November that ‘there would be problems for the Bank in 
operating the new approach if there was a political nervousness about Bank Rate 
changes’.47 As the Treasury’s Group on Monetary Policy had explained earlier in the 
year, ‘increases in Bank Rate have come to be regarded, not as a signal of the 
Authorities’ views about the appropriate level for interest rates, but rather as signals 
of economic crisis’.48 MLR, Treasury officials Painter, Cassell and Hawtin 
emphasised in a November meeting, would ‘reduce the political problems about 
changes in Bank Rate’. 49 This new system was introduced in 1972, linking Bank Rate 
to market interest rates and thus freeing it to fluctuate far more. This allowed 
politicians to no longer be ‘seen as directly responsible for movements in the rate’, 
effectively delegating the enforcement of financial discipline to a more nebulous 
entity: the market (Burnham 2011: 477). 
   CCC could not solve the contradiction of buoyant personal borrowing and a 
corporate liquidity shortage, but it offered a way to temporarily alleviate the pressure. 
This possibility was reinforced by the CBI’s lobbying, whose demands chimed with 
those of the City (Moran 1984: 44). All of this lends support to the claims of crisis 
resolution approaches to financialisation. Nevertheless, the Treasury’s acquiescence 
cannot be understood in a purely functionalist manner. What persuaded the Treasury 
to endorse CCC was the fact that it would allow important exporting companies 
access to credit, at the same time as allowing the authorities to seemingly let go of the 
reigns of monetary policy.  
   This interpretation has certain ramifications for how IPE should theorise 
state/market relations. The state is not, and has arguably never been, a neglected field 
of study in IPE (Clift and Rosamond, 2009). Nevertheless, the ways in which the 
state is conceptualised are often unsatisfactory. The financialisation literature’s 
disinterest in statecraft reflects the more general neglect of state governance strategies 
in the dualistic state/market IPE analyses of Gilpin (1987) and Strange (1996), as 
well as the pluralist state theory of scholars influenced by neo-Gramscian IPE (Van 
der Pijl 1989; Underhill 2000). In contrast, the case of CCC demonstrates the 
centrality of statecraft strategies - depoliticisation in particular - for understanding the 
relationship between states and financial markets. As Bulpitt (1986: 28) argued, a key 
governing goal, especially in recessionary conditions, is to discover an ‘automatic 
pilot, which, like the Gold Standard, would depoliticize’ economic management. In 
fact, the evidence presented here suggests that financial deregulation in times of crisis 
should be understood as the outsourcing of discipline from the state to less overtly 
political mechanisms. The British authorities viewed the boundary between politics 
and markets less as a division between two externally-related and opposed modes of 
social organisation, and more as a line to be strategically blurred in order to ensure 
that governance was insulated from scrutiny. This contributes to the large body of 
literature challenging the notion of the mutual antagonism of states and markets, and 
in addition points to the calculated, strategic dimensions of this relationship. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   This article began by examining interventions in the financialisation literature that 
deal with the causal relationship between productive stagnation and financial 
expansion, gathered here into two categories: expropriation and crisis resolution 
approaches. Yet neither approach has placed significant emphasis on the role of 
statecraft. The state is generally conceptualised as a weathervane, with policy 
automatically changing direction in response to changing factional forces or 
economic imperatives. As such, the craft of governance is understood to have limited 
explanatory value. This mirrors a broader shortcoming in politics/economy dualist 
and neo-Gramscian-inspired IPE approaches to state/market relations. On the 
contrary, this article has endeavored to demonstrate the centrality of statecraft in 
mediating the processes of financialisation. In particular, it was argued that 
depoliticisation is a valuable analytical tool for understanding how governments 
attempt to insulate themselves from criticism by exercising economic policy covertly 
through financialised channels. This focus on statecraft can provide greater insights 
into the veracity of the competing expropriation and crisis resolution accounts of 
financialisation, and in turn cast state/market relations in a more strategic light.   
   The UK’s CCC deregulation is a useful case for demonstrating the importance of 
statecraft. While the existing literature rightly points out that CCC was the Bank’s 
brainchild, this radical deregulation nevertheless had to be accepted by the Treasury – 
the predominant economic department and a body with broader institutional duties to 
ensure economic and social stability. This article showed that intensifying economic 
stagnation was experienced by the Treasury as two distinct but interrelated obstacles 
to smooth economic governance: a personal borrowing boom and a company 
liquidity crisis. This posed a major threat to the government’s key post-devaluation 
policy goal, namely to maintain a balance of payments surplus. The ceiling controls 
could not effectively repress personal borrowing in order to reduce consumption and 
imports without simultaneously starving companies of liquidity and thus reducing 
exports. Furthermore, the post-devaluation controls were too politicised to allow the 
government the leeway to carry out the necessary regressive redistribution of 
resources. In contrast, CCC would remove all formal limits on the availability of 
credit and instead allow high interest rates to adjudicate between borrowing requests. 
This principle was lobbied for heavily by the CBI, which - with the Bank - convinced 
the Treasury that CCC had the potential to reduce consumer borrowing while 
allowing large exporting firms access to previously unavailable credit. Although 
direct evidence confirming the depoliticisation of policy is necessarily limited, due to 
officials’ and politicians’ unwillingness to admit to purposeful blame-shifting, there 
is sufficient archival evidence to suggest that the hands-off nature of CCC was 
welcomed because it would allow policy goals to be met in a depoliticised manner. 
This would consequently shield the authorities from the blame for the accelerating 
economic crisis. 
   This case study has two important implications for IPE. Firstly, although the 
evidence is by no means sufficient to reject the broader claims of the expropriation 
approach, it does suggest that CCC in particular was not passed due to the 
colonisation of the Treasury by City acolytes nor because of the City’s growing 
power to override the interests of domestic industry. Instead, CCC was a much 
deliberated over attempt to provide some kind of functional response to the 
deterioration of postwar affluence - lending support to the claims of crisis resolution 
approaches. Secondly, this case suggests that we follow Krippner (2011) in adding a 
layer of nuance to crisis resolution narratives, and to IPE debates on state/market 
relations, by considering statecraft as a powerful explanatory factor. The Treasury did 
not automatically react to the unfolding crisis by promoting financial deregulation. 
Rather, by shifting emphasis from direct controls to (partly-marketised) interest rates, 
the Treasury hoped to outsource discipline to the price mechanism. This acts as 
further evidence as to the fruitfulness of the depoliticisation framework for 
understanding state behaviour in times of crisis, which in turn sheds light on the 
distinctly strategic nature of the relationship between states and markets.  
  
 
Notes 
 
1. While Brenner (2006) argues that the rate of profit fell due to what he calls 
‘investment overhang’, Kliman (2012) argues that the rising ratio of fixed investment 
to labour (the ‘organic composition of capital’) is the cause of the fall.  
2. As Fred Hirsch (1965) approvingly observed in a widely cited polemic, 
devaluation is in many ways a ‘hoax on the public at large’ (77), in that it ‘is a way of 
achieving the necessary cut in domestic consumption by making use of the “money 
illusion”’ (75), whereby people are more willing to accept a rise in money wages and 
a cut in real wages than vice versa. In this sense, devaluation can itself be seen as a 
depoliticised strategy to increase domestic cost competitiveness by covert means. 	
3. TNA T 326/961, Bank lending: Developments up to end-October, 22 November 
1968. 
4. TNA T 326/961, Dowler to Hawtin, 25 October 1968. 
5. TNA T 326/961, Lovell to Armstrong, 14 November 1968. 
6. TNA T 326/1352, Note for the Record, 15 April 1971. 
7. TNA T 326/1352, Cassell to Ryrie, 16 April 1971. 
8. TNA T 326/1109, Note of a Meeting in the Chancellor’s Room, 16 January 1970. 
9. Ibid. 
10. TNA T 326/1263, Wass to Henley, 10 June 1971. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. 
13. This measure of profitability is calculated at replacement cost after providing for 
stock appreciation, which the Department of Trade and Industry argued measured 
profitability in ‘real’ terms. MSS.200/c/3/dg2/23, Trade and Industry magazine, 22 
September 1978.  
14. TNA T 326/962, Control of Bank Lending to the Private Sector, 27 March 1969. 
15. TNA T 326/963, Lovell to Neale, 16 October 1969. 
16. TNA T 326/963, Record of a Meeting, 19 December 1969. 
17. TNA T 326/1109, O’Brien to Jenkins, 9 January 1970. 
18. TNA T 326/1352, Policy on Bank Lending for the Rest of the Year, 7 August 
1970. 
19. TNA T 326/1352, Policy on Bank Lending for the Rest of the Year, 7 August 
1970. 
20. TNA T 326/1109, Armstrong to Figgures, 8 January 1970. 
21. TNA T 326/966, Minutes of a Meeting, 29 October 1969. 
22. TNA T 326/1352, Painter to Armstrong, 18 May 1970. 
23. TNA T 326/791, House of Commons, 24 May 1968. 
24. MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, CBI Staff Comment, 4 November 1969. 
25. MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Brief for CBI/Treasury Meeting, 19 January 1970. 
26. Ibid. 
27. MSS.200/c/3/dg2/22, Note of a Meeting, 25 November 1971 
28. TNA T 326/962, Note for the Record, 1 April 1969. 
29. TNA T 326/963, Brooke to Lovell, 10 September 1969. 
30. TNA T 326/1109, Painter to Neale, 2 April 1970. 
31. TNA T 326/1352, Note for the Record, 27 July 1970. 
32. Emphasis added. TNA T 326/1352, Painter to Kelley, 19 August 1970. 
33. TNA T 326/1261, Britton to Posner, 5 March 1971. 
34. MacDougall was also concerned that the laxity of CCC could allow an explosion 
in bank lending for consumption during the transition to the new regime, and that the 
authorities would have insufficient tools to rectify it (TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a 
meeting, 18 February 1971; TNA T 326/1261, Note of a Meeting, 3 March 1971). 
This was a prescient insight, considering the experience of the Secondary Banking 
Crisis, and one that was shared by other Treasury figures, which Needham (2014: 42) 
explores.  
35. TNA T 326/1263, Cassell to Henley, 4 June 1971. 
36. TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a Meeting, 10 March, 1971. 
37. MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, CBI Staff Comment, 4 November 1969. 
38. MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Anderson to Plumb, 19 May 1970. 
39. TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a Meeting, 10 March, 1971. 
40. MRC MSS.200/C/3/ECO/2/29, Economic Committee Meeting, 5 July 1971. 
41. Indeed, the CBI admitted in 1974 that they ‘had welcomed the liberalisation of 
monetary policy late in 1971 as providing a much needed stimulus to industry’ (MRC 
MSS.200/c/3/eco/2/7, Report on the Work of the Financial Policy Committee, 19 
September 1974). 
42. TNA T 326/1261, Posner to Cowdy, 18 February 1971. 
43. TNA T 326/1261, Note of a Meeting, 3 March 1971. 
44. TNA T 326/1262, Barber to Heath, 6 May 1971. 
45. TNA T 326/1261, Minutes of a Meeting, 1 March 1971. 
46. TNA T 326/1702, Note of a Meeting, 12 November 1971. 
47. Ibid. 
48. TNA T 338/39, Report of the Group on Monetary Policy, 20 January 1971. 
49. TNA T 326/1702, Note of a Meeting, 12 November 1971. 
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